Settlement Attempts in China: The Shanghai Peace Conference 1919-1920

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ABSTRACT: The Shanghai Peace Conference is one of the most prominent attempts of a peaceful settlement that China witnessed during the Warlords (1916-1928). The conference was held between two delegations on both sides of the conflict; the military government in the south, which has constitutional legitimacy, and the Beijing government, which enjoys international recognition and Japanese support. The conference aimed to restore the unity of China ravaged by internal political divisions and military conflicts. However, there was a lack of confidence in the position of the northern government in responding to the demands of the southern government.

Keywords: China's Political History, Sun Yat-sen, Tuan Chi Jui.

1. INTRODUCTION

After the end of World War I, the international attitude towards the situation in China changed, especially after it reached a dangerous stage of political and military conflicts, accompanied by a significant worsening in the size of Japanese influence at the expense of other influential countries in China. Allies, especially the United States, are urging both sides of the conflict, the military government in the south (Canton) and the central government in the north (Beijing) to end the conflict and reunite the country. In line with this, the Shanghai Peace Conference held most of the talks on the demands made by the delegation of the southern government. In particular the reinstatement of the 1912 Constitution, the dissolution of the new parliament, the convening of the old parliament, the suspension of the military program of the northern government, and the disclosure of secret agreements signed by the northern government with Japan. In general, there was a climate of mistrust in the position of the northern government in responding to the demands of the southern government delegation. Within these contexts, many questions arise. What are the starting points of the two governments in conducting the peace negotiations? To what extent was the Northern Government serious about peace? What is the nature of the peace that she wanted? How did the submission of the Jiangsu clique to the military government affect its position on peace negotiations? Were the negotiations affected by the decisions of the Peace Conference in Paris? These and other questions we tried to answer by referring to the documents of the US State Department entitled (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States). It referred to abbreviated (FRUS) and adopted parts of the years (1918, 1919, 1920) The US Commission in Beijing and its Consulates General in Canton and Shanghai are closely following the proceedings and the conditions leading up to the conference.
2. Preface

Tuan Chi Joy's policy and domestic and international position

Since the beginning of 1917, China has witnessed political divisions, followed by military conflicts, mainly triggered by the policy of Prime Minister Tuan Chi-Joy to abolish the 1912 Constitution, dissolve parliament and other constitutional institutions (Dreyer, 1998). His policy led to the withdrawal of National Party (国民党-KMT) leader Sun Yat-sen and more than 330 deputies from the same party to Shanghai and Canton. They announced that they did not recognize the central government in Beijing and formed a new government in canton (the center of south China's Guangdong Province), the military government. On August 18, 1917, they organized a new parliament in Canton and decided to remain in session until the 1912 Constitution was restored and the dissolved parliament convened (Tung,, 1968; Mackerras, 1998). On August 31, the new parliament convened an extraordinary meeting to approve the law governing the military government and elected Sun Yat Sen as commander-in-chief (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, P.94). In January 1918 the actions of this government resulted in the formation of a union between six provinces (Guangdong, Jiangxi, Yunnan, Hunan, Kweichow, and Zsichuan) (Dreyer, 1998). In view of this, the southerners have declared that they do not recognize the Beijing government. They still viewed former President Li Yuan Hong as the country's legitimate president and the dissolved parliament is the only legal body representing the people (Chi, 1970).

We do not contradict the truth if we note here that these two issues remained controversial between the governments of the north and south. The organization of this government meant that China was divided into two separate political entities, the military government, which extended its influence to all the provinces of the south and southwest, and the Beijing government, which theoretically controlled the rest of the country. Especially with the growing strength of military Governors in the central and northern provinces.

Under the circumstances of World War I, the Prime Minister of the Northern Government, Tuan Chi Joy, announced in August 1917 that China entered the war alongside the Allies. He used this position to negotiate with Japan to hold a series of loans (Club, 1972) according to these developments. He established a special office known as the Office of Participating in the War (参战办公室-OPW) and placed it under his presidency. Loans obtained at the time from Japan were estimated at $ 120 million as well as other loans (Nung, 1956). Much of it was spent on the army, which was formally prepared to take part in the war, and in fact, to annihilate other military nerve groups, including the Chihli clique (直隶军阀), which split from the Peiyang Army (北洋军) and restore the country's unity by destroying the military government in the south. In another context, Tuan Chi Joy spent some of these loans on the new parliament he set up in Beijing, which was controlled by the Anhui clique (皖系军阀). These loans have unequivocally increased the strength of Tuan Chi Joy and his military party. His forces fought a war against the South in 1917-1918, with frequent interruptions. The military Governors of Chihli, Hubei, Zsichuan, and Jiangsu provinces then intervened and called for a truce with the south, forcing Tuan Chi Joy to resign on November 20, 1917 (Tikhvinski, 1983).

This did not end Tuan Chi Joy's political influence and control over the Anhui clique and Japan's sources of funding (Dreyer, 1998). With the endorsement by the US Minister Reinsch, President Feng Kuo chang's attempts to keep Tuan out of the domestic scene by appointing him as commander-in-chief of the war-fighting army failed, and even enabled him to re-engage fully with military leaders in the north (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, P.84).

At the time that Calls have been made for a peaceful compromise with the south, notably from Jiangsu Governor General Li Chun, is a One of a Chihli generals, and the Jiangsu Society, Attempts and pressure to push President Feng Kuo Chang to resign emerged (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, P.88). So the latter was forced to reappoint Tuan Chi Joy as prime minister on March 23, 1918 (Nung, 1956). His initiative was the signing of two secret agreements on maritime and military cooperation with Japan on May 16 and 17, respectively, and ratified on May 30 of the same year (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, P.106). Another agreement on September 25 of the same year in which Tuan Chi-joy pledged to support Japan's interests in Shantung Province at the peace conference (which was hoped to be held after the war) in return for Japan's pledge to withdraw its troops from Shantung to Tsingtao City, deploy Japanese troops along the Shantung...
Railway and to delegate responsibility for the protection of areas vacated by the Japanese army to the Chinese authorities. The return of the Shantung Railway will be a joint Sino-Japanese railway in return for a loan of 40 million Japanese yen to China for the construction of new railways in the region. In return, Japan will keep all the property and revenues of the project under its auspices until the loan is repaid. The two sides agreed that this agreement would remain confidential until the peace conference (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.2, P.205). Not surprisingly, the secrecy of these agreements has provoked negative reactions from Allied countries because of their exclusion from participation, and feared that they would be the beginning of new demands by Japan to China, and the dissipation of national revenues sparked a public outcry between the Chinese (F. R. U. S.,1918, Vol.1,P.108; Wheelr, 1919).

Under the influence of these variables, Tuan Chi Joy is no longer determined to resolve the issue with the South militarily. Things seemed to be moving towards a rapprochement with the South and the initiation of a policy of peaceful settlement, especially after the election of Hsu Shi chang as president of the republic in the north and the election of Tsen Chung Hsuan as prime minister in the south, both supporters of ending the war (Eligibility, Nung, 1956).

More importantly, the international situation began to change after the end of World War I, towards the domestic situation in China and the expansion of Japanese influence in China. In a telegram to President Hsu Shih chang, President Woodrow Wilson congratulated him on his election as president, urging him to achieve peace and reunite the country before China looks forward to cooperating with its brotherly countries (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, P.111).

It is likely here that the United States has found that achieving peace in China may limit the possibility of expanding Japanese influence in China, which has masked the veil of cooperation between the two countries. In particular, Japan has taken the path of supporting some northern military parties at the expense of others. Not surprisingly, the US government was alerted to the role played by the OWP in establishing Japanese influence in China during the war by signing loans that guaranteed China's natural resources. He was more inclined towards imposing military rule on China under Tuan Chi-joy, making personal gains and destroying the southern government than he wanted to participate in the war. In light of this, Reinsch advised his government to give moral support to the settlement attempts and encourage the convening of a national conference to find a balance in the political situation in China. To achieve this he called for the following steps:

1. The US government should adopt a broad publicity campaign to publicize all the agreements the Chinese government has signed with Japan, especially those concerning China's natural resources. In the meantime, the Tuan Chi Joy practiced repressive tactics against Chinese authorities who tried to disseminate or leak information about these agreements.

2. To inform the Chinese Government that the US Government considers dissatisfaction with its management of the situation in China, especially those that have paved the way for Japan's monopoly on China's natural resources. They must establish sound post-war relations.

3. To be clear to Chinese politicians, military and public opinion that the United States refuses to use the OWP for personal and partisan policies, but its activity must be determined by the purpose for which it was established. The Chinese government should make unremitting efforts to unify the country under its authority; otherwise, the recognition of the legitimacy of its rule will be debated.


In the same context, President Wilson instructed the US Consul General in Canton to convince the military government in the south of the need to achieve peace and unity in the country. In addition, other allies (Britain and France), through their ministerial commissioners in China, have lodged strong protests with the Chinese government in Beijing that their participation in the war is strictly nominal. It spent the remaining financial
resources of the fines of the Boxer War (1898-1901), from which the Allies agreed to postpone their receipt for five years, on party conflicts. This was considered a major blow to the Tuan clique, followed by another blow, especially after the change of the Japanese government, where the Cabinet of Terauchi was dissolved and Hara Takashi formed a new cabinet. The new government changed its policy in favor of Tuan Chi Joy because of the Western rejection of its expansion in China and the protest of the military government in the south (Nung, 1956).

In this atmosphere, the Japanese government feared that allied countries would lead the way in China by calling for peace. It was unavoidable for her to present herself as a pacifist. She called on her ambassador to Washington to adopt a friendly message to military leaders in the north and south to end the state of war, achieve peace and reunite the country. This, in conjunction with the governments of Britain, France and Italy, explained his government's view that there are no obstacles to the settlement of the situation in the country if the parties give up personal interests and constitutional mechanisms. Should the US government adopt this attempt, it should refer its discussion and approval to the representatives of the five powers (Britain, the United States, France, Russia and Japan) in Beijing.

Consider avoiding any manifestation of recognition of the military government in the South (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, PP.114-115). This means that it continues to support the Beijing government, and that its interests require that the Southern government not be recognized.

In response, the US government expressed the words of its Secretary of State that it fully agreed with the Japanese Government. Convincing the disputing parties must be strengthened by providing financial assistance in return for satisfactory guarantees (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, P.120). In line with this, Northern Government Prime Minister Hsu Shih chang has contacted the southern leaders, receiving assurances that they are ready for a settlement. As a result, on November 17, 1918, he ordered the cessation of military operations, the withdrawal of northern forces and support for the efforts to unify the country (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, PP.120-121). This will be followed by a peace conference.

Internationally, since early January 1919, there have been many talks between representatives of the Beijing government and representatives of allies on a statement to stop making any foreign loans to China until peace is achieved and the country's unity reunited. The United States has proposed an arms embargo on China. However, no specific action was taken at the time because of the Japanese government's refusal to intervene in contracts and agreements with China in this regard (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.1, PP.329-330).

It is clear that allied countries, especially the United States, were keen to stop the internal fighting that was bound to go in favor of the pro-Japanese party, as long as the latter continues to support. The United States sought and supported peace processes.

3. The Shanghai Peace Conference (February-March 1919)

In line with the domestic and international situation, the North and South governments prepared two delegations to represent them in the settlement negotiations. Former Interior Minister Chu chi chien headed the Northern Government delegation, while Tung Shao yi headed the delegation of the Military Government of the South (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.1, P.299).

February 10, 1919 was set as the date for the opening of the conference, and the head of the military government delegation, Tung Shao yi, urged the delegation members to come to Shanghai before the scheduled date. To cover the expenses of the conference, a sum of 10,000 dollars in salt tax revenue was allocated and the full amount was handed over to Tung Shao Yi (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.1, P.296). The Northern government proposed that Nanking be the venue for the conference, while the Southern government insisted that the conference be held in Shanghai, and the Northern government agreed (F. R. U. S., 1918, Vol.1, P.135).

The explanation for this is that Shanghai was the center of the Chinese bourgeoisie, which has long supported Sun Yat-sen. In addition, Shanghai has been a hub for foreign communities in China, making it more of a compromise. Nanking had become a nerve center of the Northern military, so the southern government wanted to stay away.
It is important to note here that the start of negotiations between the parties was delayed due to several obstacles. Including the failure of the Northern government to recognize the province of Shanxi in the truce area, as it remained a disputed area between the two governments, and it was evident by the repeated military operations launched by the Northern government forces in the provinces of Shanxi and Fujian. Under the control of the Southern government. In the light of this, Tung Shao Yi sent a telegram to the diplomatic corps in Beijing, calling for an effective end to the military operations launched by the Northern forces in Shanxi and not content with statements calling for peace and called for the adoption of the proposals put forward by the military governor of Jiangsu Province, General Li Chun, on February 6, 1919(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.1,P.297). Which became a mediator of peace between the Beijing government and the military government, which included(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.1,P.296):

1. Cease military operations of the two armies in Fujian, Shanxi and West Hubei.
2. To stop the advance of the infantry forces towards Hubei and Shanxi, and that the authorities take responsibility for the suppression of bandits and refrain from increasing the numbers of armies.
3. The truce measures in West Hubei and South Shanxi shall be mutually established by the commanders themselves.
4. Send well-known officers into Shanxi, selected by the leaders of the two negotiating delegations, to monitor the division of territory along the front line.
5. After each side knows its territory, the army will be responsible for suppressing bandits, protecting the population within its borders, and refraining from launching attacks throughout the truce.

Two copies of the proposals were submitted to the Beijing government and one to the military government in Canton. The Administrative Council held a meeting at which these proposals were discussed and ended up being approved(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.1,P.296). Based on this, it was announced on 13 February 1919 that the provinces of Shanxi and Fujian would be included within the Armistice Zone. However, the subsequent period saw military breaches by the Northern Government forces as what will be seen. Although agreement was reached on the issue of Shanxi and Fujian, there were more important obstacles that hindered the start of negotiations, particularly the issue of dissolving the OPW and the continued government of the North to receive financial assistance from foreign countries. After the end of World War I, the Northern government announced its intention to continue implementing its military program by relying on Japanese financial aid until peace was signed at the Versailles conference. This contradicts the demands made by the Southern Government delegation(Nung,1956).

Although Western powers with influence in China had previously said they were unwilling to interfere in the negotiations, they were fully briefed on the details of the negotiations.

Sammons, illustrate this the US Consul General in Shanghai, in a note addressed to US Minister Plenipotentiary in China, Reinsch, saying that Mr. Tung Shao Yi, head of the Southern government negotiating delegation, sent him a copy of his telegram to the diplomatic corps in Beijing, which contained several views. Regarding the position of the Shanxi case. In addition, a copy of the telegram sent by the Prime Minister of Beijing to Tung Shao yi, which explained the position of the Northern Government on the South Government's demand to dissolve the Office for Participation in War(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.1,P.303), was attached to it. It is clear here that the United States and other countries with interests in China were not far from the negotiating process and were on standby for whatever might affect the nature of their engagements and interests.

It is inevitable to say that the insistence of the Northern government to continue its military program, the last opening of the conference until the twenty of February, where the sessions of the conference opened in what was known as the German club(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.1,P.299; Northern Times,1919). However, the actual convening of its meetings was delayed until February 28, and Tung Shao Yi, head of the Southern Government delegation, put forward the demands of his government, which were summarized as follows(Nung,1956):
2. Dissolving the army to participate in the war.
3. Stop borrowing loans.
4. Send all diplomatic documents related to the Sino-Japanese military agreements to the peace conference for consideration.

The Northern government categorically rejected the first three demands, while the head of its delegation, Chu Chi Chien, accepted the latter demand. However, he was surprised that his government refused to send the documents and even announced a new document signed with Japan on February 5, 1919, that is, in preparation for the opening of the conference. The document stipulates prolonging Sino-Japanese military cooperation (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.1, PP.390-391).

This is indicative of the fact that the head of the delegation was not provided with sufficient powers and that his government did not intend to agree to any condition that would affect its sources of strength, but that it was further fortifying its position. The declaration of such a document and in such circumstances was tantamount to put the Southern government under pressure and military threat and notify it of its weak position and that the northern government is acting out of strength and external support.

The Northern government tried to absorb the resentment of the southern government, declaring the establishment of the National Defense Army, which is in fact no more than another name for the army participating in the war, and their solution remained a constant demand of the Southern government (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.1, P.361) in addition, such a maneuver was intended to provide a legitimate cover for northern government forces.

After it became clear to Tung Shao Yi that the delegation of the Northern Government was not provided with sufficient powers, he began to communicate directly with the diplomatic corps in Beijing through a series of correspondence. On February 27, he sent a telegram to President Hsu Shih chang criticizing the continuation of the Northern government's military program, represented by the OP W, Loan Amortization and the entry into force of Sino-Japanese military agreements. In response, Northern Prime Minister Chien Neng-hsun responded by telegram to the head of the southern government negotiating delegation on February 28. He explained that the OPW is a product of China's participation in World War I and is now an outlet to supply China with weapons, money and ships. Japan's financial aid is a natural result of our approval of the Japanese loan and the Sino-Japanese agreement. Therefore, the Office of Participation in War will continue until peace is signed in Europe and the withdrawal of the forces of the two parties because the Loan Agreement for Participation in War will remain in force until that day. The Office for War Participation would then lose its relevance and transfer its powers to the Ministry of Defense. Denouncing Tung Shao Yi's position, Chien Neng-hsun questioned whether the secession of the Southwest (the sphere of influence of the southern government) and the convening of the Shanghai North-South Peace Conference are directed against the loan to participate in the war. Would the dissolution of the army participating in the war and the termination of that loan restore unity to the country? At the end of the telegram, he invited him to take into account the view of the Northern Government (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.1, PP.305-306).

The delegation representing the Southern government was aware of the magnitude of the new maneuver, which coincided with new breaches of the military truce by the northern government forces in Shanxi, led by the military governor of Shanxi, General Chen Chun fan. On the basis of this, the head of the negotiating delegation, Tung Shao-yi, congratulated Mr. John Gordon, British Minister Plenipotentiary in Beijing, and called on him to put an end to the manipulation of the Northern government by the actual commitment to the truce (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.1, PP.305-306). The delegation of the northern government gave 48 hours to answer the demands of the southern government. Forty-eight hours passed without any response, which was explained by the Northern government's unwillingness to make peace. In view of this, the southern government delegation announced on March 2, 1919, the suspension of negotiations until further notice,
followed by the resignation of the head of the Northern government delegation (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol. 1, PP. 307-308). To justify the situation before the public, which blamed the delegations, the southern government delegation issued the same day a statement addressed to the Chinese press and all legislative bodies, commercial and educational organizations. He pointed out at the beginning the reasons for holding the conference. Among the most important complications in the cases of Shanxi and the dissolution of the army to participate in the war and their opposition to the path to peace. In addition, the delegation did not receive complete copies of the Sino-Japanese military agreements and their annexes and a full copy of the Loan Agreement for Participation in War. The North delegation provided only copies of naval and military agreements without attaching them to the annexes. He added that peace can be achieved only by obtaining the assets of all agreements and removing obstacles to peace, and the success of the two steps depends on each other (Ibid, PP. 308-309).

Thus, the sessions of the conference stopped without achieving anything, and in the estimation of the US Secretary of State Reinsch may be linked to the waiting for the delegations to the outcome of the conference of Versailles, neither of them tried to commit itself to any political assurances. However, the situation has had a negative impact on the situation in China. President Hsu’s Peace Party has lost much of its prestige. As well as questioning the possibility of the conference to find a settlement. In addition, while the President has shown his sincerity in his motives for peace, the leaders of the Northern Military Party have done their most to obstruct the success of the conference. It led to the failure of the conference even to realize its responsibilities as the two delegations entered into a bickering for one of them when it should have been Formulate a program for the reconstruction of the country. The military government in the South was unconscious or deliberately ignored the situation in China and contributed to the destruction of the conference by devoting its efforts in plotting political machinations to strengthen its position in the disputed provinces (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol. 1, P. 328).

It is clear that the interruption of the conference sessions was temporary and as far as the proceedings of the Versailles Conference were concerned, it was affected by the contradictions of the situation in the North and its division between the President’s Peace Party and the pro-Japanese military party, which was seeking to impose its will at the conference.

It is important to note here that from the time the United States submitted the arms embargo against China in December 1918 until the final suspension of deliveries in mid-March 1919, the Japanese government handed over Beijing’s government and ammunition worth 15 million yen. Therefore, the adoption of the arms embargo at the time did not provoke negative attitudes of the military government in the South, and that the Northern government received weapons and ammunition to enable it to resume military operations against the south at any time (Ibid., PP. 329-330).

Negotiations between the two delegations resumed on April 7, after mediation by the military rulers of the Middle Yangtze River Valley and the commander of the Wu fu Division in Hangzhou (Nung, 1956). In the meantime, the two delegations seemed inclined to keep the negotiations from media propaganda, and decided to hold secret meetings, especially as some Chinese newspapers that are pro-Japanese policy in China, especially the Shanghai Times, worked to provoke misunderstanding between the two delegations by questioning the head of the southern delegation, Tang Chi yao (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol. 1, P. 342).

The agenda of the conference included the discussion of the proposals made by the delegation of the southern government, which included (Nung, 1956):

1. Repeal of the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement.

2. Abolition of the National Defense Office and its Special Forces (the OWP and its Army)

3. Liquidation of loans to participate in the war.


5. The governments of the north and south used loans for participating in the war to carry out reforms in the provinces of Shansi and Henan.

6. Reducing the number of armies in the country.
7. Developing the national economy and organizing reform loans.
8. Separation of civilian, military and local self-governments.

It is clear that the first four points touched the foundations on which Prime Minister Tuan Chi Joy was based in supporting his troops, while the last four represented an attempt to initiate important strategic reforms in the country. Although the Chinese public supported the first four demands, the northern government completely rejected them. Regarding the restoration of the old parliament, neither the public’s indifference nor the approval of the northern government has been met (Nung, 1956).

The impact of the decisions of the Versailles Conference on the negotiations Tuan Chi Joy and his military party continued to receive Japanese support and funding and to back the renamed Army of Participation in the War. In return, the price was what he termed "cooperation or happy agreement", which was the cooperation of Tuan Chi Joy on the issue of the succession of Japan to Germany in the province of Guangdong (Dreyer, 1998). At the meeting of the Versailles Conference, the Japanese negotiating delegation unveiled at the meeting of the Council of 10 powers on April 22, 1919 that the Chinese government signed a secret agreement with his government on September 24, 1918, in which it approved the Japanese presence in Shantung in exchange for Japan providing the Chinese government with a loan of 20 million yen (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol. I, PP. 123-128). This has aroused public resentment in China, especially among the intellectual class ( ).

The next day, members of the Northern government’s governing council filed a memorandum with US The Consul at Canton Pontius to US President Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George, warning of the damage to the 21 demands for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also violates China’s commitment to treaties with other countries and contradicts the letter and spirit of the 14 principles announced by US President Woodrow Wilson. In view of this, they called for listening to the demands of the Chinese delegation negotiating at the Versailles Conference, concerning the 21 demands and the secret conferences and the consequent secret agreements (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol. V, P.; Reinsch, 1922). However, the decisions of the conference were disappointing. On April 28, 1919, the conference decided to recognize the transfer of German concessions in Guangdong to Japan (Cohen, 2010).

The decisions of the Versailles conference provoked negative reactions in China, especially among the new intellectual class of society. Beijing University witnessed student demonstrations condemning these decisions (Gupte, 1971; Chatterji, 1969; Kodansha, vol. I, 1983). This was reflected in the proceedings of the Shanghai Peace Conference, in light of the revolutionary frenzy of the Southern government delegation at the conference on 13 May 1919, a final ultimatum to the Northern Government, which was formulated in eight demands and was followed by the resignation of both delegations to their subordinates. The demands were as follows (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol. V, PP. 347-349):

1. The Shanghai Peace Conference shall declare its refusal to recognize the decision of the Versailles Conference to transfer the German concessions in Shantou to Japan.
2. The Conference shall declare that all secret agreements signed between the Government of Beijing and the Government of Japan shall be invalid and shall punish those responsible for their conclusion.
3. Immediately dissolve the Army of Participation in War, the National Defense Army and the Defense Frontier Army. These formations are the outcome of the Sino-Japanese military agreement.
4. The expulsion of the provincial governors military and civilians, known for their bad reputation and do not enjoy the support of public opinion.
5. The conference issued a statement recognizing the illegality of the dissolution of former President Li Yuan hung to the parliament in 1917. According to the signatories’ view, this condition would invalidate the Sino-Japanese agreements because the (old) Legislative Council did not vote on them.
6. Form a special administrative council of distinguished national men to be selected and recommended by the Conference. The formation of the Council of Ministers shall be subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers.

7. All issues referred by the Conference to special committees of inquiry and other issues to be submitted to the Conference shall be examined separately.

8. The Conference formally recognizes Mr. Hsu Shih chang as the Interim President of the Republic for the performance of the functions of that office until the Parliament officially decides to elect a successor.

With regard to the first request, the two delegations agreed. The second demand was made by the delegation of the northern government that the Sino-Japanese military agreement would end once the peace agreement was signed at the Versailles conference. As for the third demand, the delegation asserted that these armies would be dissolved as soon as the general disbanding of the armies was agreed upon in accordance with the plan already established. With regard to the fourth demand concerning the expulsion of the infamous military and civilian rulers, the delegation explained that this was the prerogative of the federal government(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.V,P.345). The fifth demand concerning the restoration of the old parliament was the most complicated issue and was governed by two things. The first is the Japanese government’s position that China and Japan continue to implement the military agreements. The second is the adherence of the Japanese-backed northern military parties to the new parliament, which cost them much hope in the elections. From a legal point of view, the constitutional period of the old parliament is over and cannot be reactivated(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.V,P.351). The sixth and seventh demands were not settled. The recent demand to recognize President Hsu, as interim president did not win approval from the Northern delegation, which made it clear that President Hsu had long won international recognition, and that any such action would undermine the foundations of the government and harm the country(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.V,P.345).

Head of the negotiating delegation of the Southern government, Tung shao yi, made the demands with certainty that no positive results could be achieved at the Shanghai Conference. In an attempt to calm the situation, the northern government announced its readiness to discuss the first item of the demands made by the southern government delegation(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.V,P.345).

Even so, they were not serious because their interests were so closely linked to Japan’s continued presence in China.

Evidence of the above is that she not only accepted the resignation of her delegation, but also ordered all delegations present at the conference to leave Shanghai directly to Beijing. Meanwhile, the southern government refused to accept the resignation of its delegation and announced its readiness to continue attempts to compromise between the two parties(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.V,P.345).

After the Versailles decision on the Guangdong issue, the northern parties have become more assertive. Before then, there had been some willingness to compromise on issues such as the dissolution of the northern and southern parliaments and the formation of a new parliament. However, after the decision of the Versailles conference, she was completely unwilling to hear any idea of a compromise. When the eight South’s demands arrived in Beijing, a meeting was held at President Hsu’s palace, at which the leaders of the Info Party expressed their rejection of those demands using the harshest words. They pointed out that the Beijing government had no open door. They summoned the negotiating delegation to Beijing immediately. A final ultimatum was sent to the southern provinces, demanding it end its independence and submit to the Beijing government. They threatened to use military force against it if it failed to do so. In another context, their efforts to co-opt some of the southern military individually by encouraging them to share in the proceeds of the reorganization loan made progress in reaching an understanding(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.V,PP.351-352).

On the other hand, Tuan Chi Joy has set conditions for the restoration of the old parliament, especially the continuation of the war-fighting army and the dissolution of its troops, and the continuation of the secret treaties Sino-Japanese. President Hsu also expressed his readiness to reinstate the old parliament if he secured
his re-election as president, but the southern government rejected the compromise (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.V, P. 345).

The Southern delegation's presentation of these eight demands resulted in the suspension of the conference on May 15 and the resignation of both the North and the South. This second suspension of the conference was the final failure of President Hsu's peace program, a victory for the pro-Japanese military party in Beijing, and the failure of the southern government to accept a compromise. There is no doubt that the failure of the conference lies with the Northern Military Party (Anfu Club), which dominated Political power in Beijing (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.V, P. 360-361). In the meantime, there were proposals to summon Major General Li Chun of Nanking to mediate between northerners and southerners. According to many Chinese experts and officials, the Shanghai conference was a failure and little was expected of him on peace. From the point of view of foreigners living in China, the Chinese failed to develop their potential to solve the country's problems, and the Northern Military Party, with the support of Japan, had a heavy weight in China (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.V, P. 353).

An attempt by a government in the south to crack down on the northern government failed internationally and domestically. That was because the Versailles conference did not treat the Shantung issue as a Chinese national issue, but rather treated it as an issue of international compromises and compromises between Japan and allied countries, citing the betrayal of Chinese Prime Minister Tuan Chi Joy. According to the 1918 Treaty, Guangdong moved to Japan in return for support. Allied nations were not in a position to seriously undermine Japan's influence in China. In another context, we should also realize that the Allied countries were concerned that the Beijing government should remain in power as the official government in the country. It is noteworthy that the southern government, by putting forward these demands, aimed to divert the Chinese public's attention from the Versailles to the Shanghai Peace Conference to affect the position of the Beijing government.

4. Resumption of Negotiations

In early July 1919, representatives of countries of interest in China, notably Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, submitted a joint memorandum, which the British Minister delivered on their behalf to the governments of Beijing and Canton. They noted that their countries are deeply concerned about the delay in settling difficulties in China due to the suspension of the Shanghai Peace Conference. They called for its re-convening and successful completion of the negotiations as soon as possible by finding a just solution to all issues and in the common interest of the country and the Chinese people, and taking necessary action on the party initiating the resumption of military operations (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.V, P. 354). In line with this, the Beijing Cabinet of Ministers held a meeting at which he decided to entrust Mr. Chu Chi chen with returning to Shanghai and resuming negotiations with the South delegation. In the event of his refusal to resume his post, Mr. Wang Yi tang will be assigned to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Political Chairman of the Anfu Club.

However, the cabinet feared that this would impose its will on the government, putting the conference at great risk. In general, the public welcomed the memorandum, as the international position was able to take decisive measures to reorganize the situation in China (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.V, P. 355-356). In an official response to the military government in the South, Dr. Wu Teng fang said the military government firmly supports the ministers of the Allied countries calling for the re-convening of the Shanghai Peace Conference and the resumption of negotiations. On July 7, the Canton Times commented on the memorandum, expressing the opinion of many Cantonese intellectuals that if the memorandum actually prevents the military from carrying out their military threats, it gives hope for stability. The objectives of the Beijing government are contrary to the constitutional aspirations and demands of southerners. "If the powers wish to show their goodwill and sincerity, they should deal fairly with China, return Kweichow and former German interests in Guangdong to China and withdraw recognition and support from corrupt traitors and military personnel who have prospered and gained great wealth through the assistance they received through these countries should show their sympathy for the cause of democracy and help the people realize their legitimate aspirations" (F. R. U. S., 1919, Vol.V, PP. 355-356).
In view of the above, the two governments moved in August 1919 to resume negotiations. The Government of the North announced that Parliament Speaker Wang I Tang was the head of the Northern Negotiating Delegation. It was the most senior civilian commander in the Anfu Club. The order was not approved by the southern government and demanded to be replaced by another man, but the Beijing government clung to it and threatened to use force if southerners continued to refuse to deal with it, claiming that the southerners refused to negotiate. Meanwhile, the head of the Southern delegation, Tang Shao I, said he would not allow any personal objections against the head of the northern delegation that would destroy the peace negotiations. At the same time, the southern government has made the northern government's disclosure of secret agreements with Japan a prerequisite for opening negotiations. Before reuniting with the north, it should be known to what extent and in what way the state was committed to foreign commitments. The head of the delegation of the North Sought to meet this demand by submitting the relevant documents to the conference, which he claimed to have received from the Beijing government. However, the head of the southern delegation, Tang, rejected the method of confidential presentation of documents at the conference. He announced his resignation afterwards but the Southern government refused to resign on October 5. The head of the northern delegation, for his part, Sought Tang's invitation to open formal negotiations and sent two delegates but refused to receive them. This was followed by the resignation of a number of members of the northern delegation and the departure of several other members of the southern delegation from Shanghai. The matter then turned to a media war between the two sides and each tried to blame the failure of the negotiations on the other(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.V,PP.396-397).

In the meantime, submitted many telegrams and petitions to the Beijing government in which she denounced the head of the northern delegation. Crane attributed the US minister to China to two things, The first is that it is a media aspect practiced by the Anfu Club. The second is the Chinese public opinion, which was considered Anfu Club, the party belonging to the head of the northern delegation, which he was interested in the interests of the Japanese, against whom the rising public opposition largely following the decision of the Versailles Conference on the Guangdong issue. However, Wang remained adamant on his position and did not resign because he was aware of the great loss of prestige and stance of his party. In mid-October, he suffered a failed assassination attempt. At the discretion of the US minister said neither the Anfu Club nor the extremists in the military government in the south had any strong desire to find a practical solution to the difficulties and complications that hindered the path of peace. The constitutional issue, which was the nominal cause of the civil war, has receded and the conflict between two groups of professional politicians and military leaders has become. All this made the prospects for peace in the early 1920s seem slim. Since the limits of the powers of the rival governments were only a few miles from their capital. Therefore, their role has been weak in running the country whether the actual military governor of the province derives its authority from Beijing or from Canton(F. R. U. S.,1919, Vol.V,P.397).

According to the US Consul General in the canton of Bergholz, the main reason for the failure of the peace negotiations was the rejection by the head of the northern negotiating delegation of the southern delegation's demand for clause 5 of the eight demands that recognize the authority of former President Li Yuan hung and authorize him to dissolve the new parliament formed by the Northern government.

"It is absolutely impossible for the North to accept the fifth clause. If this is not changed, there is no room to discuss or present any other issues," (F. R. U. S.,1920, Vol.V,PP.418-419) said head of the Northern delegation Chu chi Chen. However, there are other reasons that have contributed to the failure of the negotiations, especially the insistence of the Anfu Club to use military force to subdue its opponents. President Hsu Shih-Chang's unwillingness to lose his post as president. The continued existence of the new parliament in the north meant that the old parliament in the south could not regain its powers. The two sides also failed to act with integrity, stopping the destruction of the constitution by the northerners and the declaration of protection by southerners as an obstacle to peace and the reunification of the country(Nung,1956).

The decisions of the Versailles conference, which led to the southern government's loss of confidence in the northern government and the allied countries that had called for a settlement of the situation in the country, are also not distant.
5. **Settlement attempts' failure**

In the spring of 1920, the military government in the south experienced conditions that were clearly reflected in the conduct of peace negotiations and showed flexibility and a change in the nature of demands. Meanwhile, the Jiangsu Military clique in Canton was able to take full control of the military government in Canton, resulting in the withdrawal of a number of members of the old board and parliament from the canton (Tung, 1968). In preparation for the round of negotiations to be held in the autumn of 1920 that the military government presented a memorandum in May that effectively represented the opinion of the remaining members of the administrative board and senior officials in the province of Guangdong stating the conditions to be taken as the basis for peace negotiations between the two governments. She described it as a quick step to the country's unity. Before setting these conditions among the members of the Board of Directors, the nature of the internal situation, especially the student movements, which became, according to their description, the possibility of a government in Beijing does not abolish the military treaties signed with Japan in 1920, 1919, 1918. The southern government also does not accept a unilateral statement on the cancellation of these agreements. It also stipulated that it should know all the details of these agreements, provide copies of them, and ignore all the political disputes and disputes that have arisen between the north and the south since 1911. In another context, the military government considered that the remnants of the KMT were holding the Constitution (meaning the 1912 Constitution), an issue that weakened it and kept it away from the current situation (F. R. U. S., 1920, Vol.V, pp. 420-421).

1. The Government of Beijing and the Cantonal Military Government shall jointly issue a book containing all the treaties, agreements, notes and memoranda exchanged between the Government of Beijing and foreign countries during the First World War. The two governments should pay attention to the issue of peace in China, and the two sides should avoid declaring documents or permits that would arouse public opinion.

2. The two governments should recognize Hsu Shihchang as President of the Republic, promise to be legally elected and continue to rule for one and a half years from the date of signing of the peace agreement, which is to be reached and can be re-elected in accordance with the terms of the Constitution to be discussed in the other paragraphs. Section V thereof).

3. The provinces under the Government of Beijing and those under the military government shall be represented in an interim Cabinet of Ministers appointed by the President and approved by the Parliament of the Beijing Government and the Old Parliament. This Council shall have a term of one and a half years and shall have the right to choose its successors with the approval of the President.

4. Immediately after the approval of the Council of Ministers, the old Parliament and the Parliament of the Government of Beijing shall be considered void. Legislative powers are vested in the Council of Ministers for one and a half years from the date of ratification.

5. Conducting local council elections immediately after the approval of the Council of Ministers, if they are under the control of commissioners appointed by the Council of Ministers. Such commissioners shall not belong to the provinces where they have been assigned to work and have never held public office during the Republican era. In addition, no person can be an electoral commissioner in any province where he or his wife has relatives of higher positions. In addition, elections should be held in line with the customs and laws of each province. Electoral commissioners should set up an appeal panel to consider if there is fraud in the elections. The headquarters of the Commission can be established by any province, with the exception of the provinces of Chile and Beijing-based Guangdong and Canton-based.
6. Local councils convened six months after the Cabinet approved the abolition of the above-mentioned parliaments to elect five representatives from each province to form an assembly to draft a constitution for the country.

7. Convening an assembly to enact the Constitution before the lapse of eight months from the date of ratification of the Council of Ministers. The Assembly will not be in Beijing, Canton. Meetings to draft the constitution will be held within six months of the first day of the meeting. The constitution-making assembly of the Interim Constitution (Constitution of 1912) should serve as the basis for the drafting of the new Constitution. The resolutions shall be approved by a vote of a majority of the representatives present. The quorum of the Assembly shall be three quarters of the members. If members fail to reach a decision within six months and resume their meetings again, six months will be added to the life of the cabinet.

8. Upon completion of the Constitution by the Assembly, it must be submitted to local councils and widely disseminated in the country. In addition, read aloud in the role of justice, markets, temples and other public places before ratification by local councils. If the latter passes it by a three-fourths majority to be announced and the country is obliged to implement it, the cabinet must issue an order to hold parliamentary elections in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. Immediately after the opening of the parliament session, the president and the cabinet must resign, but they continue to run their offices until their successors are chosen according to the context of the constitution.

9. During the year and a half, the Council of Ministers may not have signed agreements, loans, or other measures that would threaten China’s security and rights. In addition, that no loan is negotiated with any country, but all loans must come from the International Financial Union (consortium). If the Beijing government and the military government reach a peace agreement, the Beijing diplomatic corps should provide the military government with a copy of each document exchanged with foreign banks. Otherwise, all loans and treaties are rejected (F. R. U. S., 1920, Vol. V, PP. 420-421).

Obviously, the change in some of the board’s views stemmed from changes in the board itself, namely the fact that the Kwangsi clique held most of its seats. She showed flexibility in the possibility of abandoning the old parliament and clinging to former President Li Yuan Hong as the country’s legitimate president. This means abandoning the constitutional basis of the 1912 Constitution.

The four retreating board members (Sun Yat-sen, Tung Shao yi, Wu Teng fang and Tang Chi-yao), based in Shanghai, condemned the position of the military leaders who had taken over the military government.

In this context, they issued a joint statement on June 3, 1920, in which the members of the Administrative Council usurped the Authority. The incomplete quorum of the Council loses its decisions legitimacy, especially with the absence of Parliament in Canton. They also denounced their negotiations with the North as an attempt to win more loot and that they effectively abandoned the protection of the Constitution, and that using the slogan of protecting the Constitution is only a means to cover up their actions (F. R. U. S., 1920, Vol. V, PP. 420-421).

Under these circumstances, political bickering and exchange of charges between opponents became common. Each party to the conflict from its own angle viewed the issue of contacting the northern government to conclude a settlement. It is noteworthy from the foregoing that the parties to the conflict had contacted the northern government, but denied each other and accused him of treason.

In view of this, the retreating board members said they were still the legitimate organizers of the military government. The peace negotiations will continue with Shanghai based. All decisions taken by the (usurpers)

To alleviate the crisis, they tried to negotiate with the Northern Government. On June 5, 1920, Tang Shao Yi contacted the head of the Northern Government’s negotiating delegation, Wang I-tang, in Shanghai for negotiations. However, this coincided with the issuance of a statement by Tuan Chi Joy and Hsu Shu-Zheng, who indicated their readiness to attack the southern forces, which became part of the war between the INFO and Chihli. These negotiations were also useless at the time because the cantonal government had announced that it had abandoned the retiring board members (F. R. U. S., 1920, Vol.V, P. 436). To deny them any legitimacy to represent the military government in negotiations with the Beijing government.

In line with the requirements of the new situation, members of the new Administrative Council issued a statement on June 15, 1920. Affirming the independence of the southwestern and marine provinces from the Beijing government and the establishment of an independent government in Canton entitled "Military Government of the Republic of China" and that their national goal is to defend the Constitution and save the country (F. R. U. S., 1920, Vol.V, PP. 428-429).

In fact, this position is a retreat from the previous flexibility shown by the Council in establishing the conditions for negotiations with the Beijing government. It is also an attempt to pull the rug out from under the feet of Sun Yat-sen and the rest of the actual executive directors of the government since 1917, who withdrew from the composition of the board in protest at the Jiangsu clique’s direction to empty the military government of its real goals of defending the constitution and the old parliament.

In the same context, the statement included an accusation against Sun Yat-sen in alliance with Tuan Chi Joy and that during the past six months preceding the issuance of this statement. There were secret contacts between Sun Yat-sen and Tang Shao Yi on one side and Tuan Qi Joy. The national press in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Hong Kong has published the exchange of conditions and opinions. Under the conditions, Hsu Shih-chang, head of the northern government, should step down and be replaced by General Tuan Chi Joy. Wang I-tang becomes prime minister, Tung Shao-yi, foreign minister, and Tang Chi-yao, inspector-general of three provinces (Yunnan, Zschuan, and Kweichow). Wu Tang’s son, Fang Wu, is a minister in Washington. Sun Yat-sen receives $ 8,000 a year for staying out of the country and not creating problems. In the same statement, the leaders of the military government counted that these were the real reasons for the sudden change of attitude of Sun Yat-sen, Tang Shao-yi and their supporters, as well as the reason for Tang Shao’s decision to withdraw from the board. They also accused Sun Yat-sen of betraying their cause, conspiring against the military government and trying to eliminate it. In addition to other measures and conspiracies about the leadership of the Yunnan army, which was under the command of Li-Kan-Yuen, a citizen of Yunnan and loyal to the military government. At the same time, the leaders of the military government announced their expulsion of their delegate to the Tung Shao-yi Peace Conference and his replacement with Foreign Minister Wen Tsung-yao in the new composition of the Administrative Council, and that any action or negotiation Tang Shao-yi held with the Northern Government was invalid (F. R. U. S., 1920, Vol.V, PP. 428-431).

This is yet another attempt at the political overthrow of Sun Yat-sen, who has known his patriotism and service to the constitutional cause. It is even an attempt to free him from the real and serious quest to restore constitutionalism by seeking to re-recognize the legitimacy of former President Li Yuan-hung and the Parliament of 1913 and accusing him of reaching those conditions to find a settlement with The North's acceptance of the nomination of Tuan Chi Joi as prime minister in place of President Hsu shi-Chang means accusing him of completely abandoning his constitutional goals.

6. Conclusion

There was a clear division in the situation between Chinese President Hsu who wants a peaceful settlement of matters with the South and the Anfu Club, which wants to resolve the situation militarily, relying on Japanese financial and military support. He showed great adherence to the rejection of the demands of the military government to dissolve the Office to participate in the war and stop the loan and the announcement of secret agreements, because the answer to these demands meant to abandon the pillars of his strength.
Until the end of 1919, the military government showed great commitment to defending the constitutional issue and not showing any flexibility in negotiating this matter.

The decisions of the Versailles conference have affected the proceedings of the Shanghai conference, especially after the conference revealed secret agreements, as the military government in the south completely lost confidence in the northern government, which colluded with Japan on the Shantung case in exchange for continuing its support against the military government in the south.

• The withdrawal of a number of members of the board of directors and members of the old parliament from the Canton government affected the conduct of the Shanghai conference negotiations and the nature of the demands themselves. The Jiangsu clique, which dominated the government’s military policy, showed indifference to the constitutional goals for which it was organized.

The position of the Northern Government at the Shanghai Conference was launched in order to preserve its political and military gains, especially after the Northern Military Party held the legislative and executive powers to benefit from Japanese support.

Supporting the international position, especially the United States of America for the settlement negotiations, was linked to trying to put an end to the expansion of Japanese influence in China.

It was clear that the northern military party was insisting on imposing its will at the conference, which was rejected by the military government, which led to the suspension of the conference sessions more than once.

### References

INFO:-

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